As was one of the origins of the treaty, the deep cuts made to the Royal Navy after the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference and the London Naval Conference in 1930. The cuts imposed by both conferences and the effects of the Great Depression led to the collapse of much of the British naval industry in the early 1930s.  This seriously hampered British naval armament efforts later in the decade, leading the Admiralty to consider contracts with quantitative and qualitative restrictions of potential enemies as the best way to ensure the Royal Navy`s maritime dominance.  Maiolo argues that it is in fact unseribly important whether potential enemies are intentionally isolating the size and extent of their navies.  In particular, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the first lord of the sea between 1933 and 1938, defended such contracts. They promised a standardized classification of different warships and discouraged technical innovations that the Royal Navy was not always able to meet under existing conditions.  Chatfield`s primary desire was for the Germans to abolish their German-class armoured ships (known in the London press as „pocket boatmen“) because those who embrace the characteristics of battleships and cruisers are dangerous to his vision of a world of regulated warship types and designs.  As part of efforts to remove armoured ships, the British Admiralty declared in March 1932 and again in the spring of 1933 that Germany had „a moral right to some easing of the Treaty of Versailles].  The Anglo-German naval agreement was an attempt to improve relations between Germany and Great Britain. The Germans saw the agreement as the beginning of an alliance against the Soviet Union and France. But for Britain, it was the beginning of arms restrictions that were to limit Germany`s expansion. This agreement was considered very controversial by many other nations, because Tonnageratio gave Germany the power to produce a navy much larger than the Treaty of Versailler had authorized. It was also carried out without prior consultation with Italy or France.
The Anglo-German naval agreement was an ambitious attempt by both the British and Germans to secure better relations, but ultimately failed due to conflicting expectations between the two countries. For Germany, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to mark the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union, while for Britain, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to be the beginning of a series of arms control agreements concluded to limit German expansionism. The Anglo-German naval agreement was controversial at the time and since then, because the tonnage of 35:100 allowed Germany to build a navy beyond the borders set by the Treaty of Versaille, and London had concluded the agreement without consultation with Paris or Rome. In the late 1930s, Hitler`s disillusionment with that of the United Kingdom led German foreign policy to increasingly take the anti-uk course.  An important sign of Hitler`s changing perception of the United Kingdom was his decision in January 1939 to give the first priority to the navy in allocating money, skilled workers and raw materials and to launch Plan Z to build a colossal navy of 10 battleships, 16 „pocket boatmen“, 8 aircraft carriers , 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers and 249 submarines by 1944 to crush the Royal Navy.  Given that the fleet in Plan Z was significantly larger than was permitted in the 35:100 report in the agreement, it was inevitable that Germany would renounce it.